Corporate Governance, Voluntary Disclosure, And Firm Information Environment by Boubaker, Sabri et al.
The Journal of Applied Business Research – January/February 2015 Volume 31, Number 1 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 89 The Clute Institute 
Corporate Governance,  
Voluntary Disclosure, And Firm 
Information Environment 
Sabri Boubaker, Ph.D., Champagne School of Management (Groupe ESC Troyes), France & IRG, Université Paris Est, France 
Amal Hamrouni, Ph.D., La Rochelle Business School and University of Perpignan via Domitia, France 
Qi-Bin Liang, Ph.D., University of Perpignan via Domitia, France 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the relative performance of several corporate governance factors, 
specifically the characteristics of boards of directors, managerial ownership, and voluntary 
disclosure, in improving firm information environments. The paper uses a new empirical 
approach based on a B-convex method on a sample of 70 non-financial French listed firms 
belonging to the SBF120 index. Our findings show that 68.57% of our sample firms are located on 
the efficiency frontier. Corporate governance practices appear to serve as effective monitoring for 
the top executives of these firms, which reduces information asymmetry between insiders and 
outsiders, thereby improving the information environment. The empirical analysis also generates 
evidence that 31.42% of our sample firms lie outside the efficiency frontier. Corporate governance 
practices in many firms appear insufficient to improve firm information environments. These 
findings suggest the need for many SBF120 firms to improve their corporate governance 
practices. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
ot all investors in financial markets have access to the same information about firm quality, leading 
to an adverse selection problem since informed investors use their information advantage in their 
trading (Akerlof, 1970). This problem is likely to deepen capital market failures since it increases 
the number of transactions initiated by informed investors, which in turn increases transactions costs (e.g., O’Hara, 
1995), widens dispersion in analyst forecasts (e.g., Zhang, 2006), and increases the cost of firm capital (e.g., 
Botosan, 1997). 
 
Better corporate governance practices may mitigate the adverse selection problem and reduce information 
asymmetry (e.g., Chung et al., 2010). Agency theory provides a conceptual framework in which to study the 
relation between governance mechanisms and information asymmetry (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency theory 
holds that the role of internal governance mechanisms and practices is important to ensuring that managers act in the 
best interests of shareholders, making decisions that maximize firm value and that guarantee a transparent 
environment to outsiders. 
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) hold that the board of directors is the most important internal governance 
mechanism. The effectiveness of boards of directors depends, to a large extent, on their size and composition. Jensen 
(1993) argues that small boards are more effective, since information sharing and decision making processes are 
easier in these structures. However, Anderson et al. (2004), among others, argue that large boards ensure greater 
monitoring of the financial accounting process and improve firm transparency. Cai et al. (2006), for instance, 
provide evidence that the adverse selection problem is less important in U.K. firms with large boards. Using a 
N 
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sample of Canadian firms, Attig (2007) finds that firms with dispersed ownership and large boards exhibit lower 
information asymmetry (i.e., low price spreads). 
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the effectiveness of a board depends on its independence. Independent 
directors improve the monitoring role of boards, since they ensure protection of the firm’s overall interests against 
managers’ potential opportunistic behavior. According to Dahya et al. (2008), independent directors are important in 
ensuring shareholders that the board properly fulfills its responsibility; their presence often constrains controlling 
shareholders from diverting corporate resources for private benefit. Independent directors also are less prone to 
undertaking self-serving behaviors at the expense of minority shareholders. Controlling shareholders are, thus, less 
inclined to withhold information from the financial markets. Therefore, the presence of independent directors is 
likely to improve the firm information environment and reduce information asymmetry between insiders and 
outsiders. Empirical evidence, such as that of Chen and Jaggi (2000) in Hong Kong and Kanagaretnam et al. (2007) 
in the US, is consistent with this prediction. Other empirical studies, such as Cheng and Courtenay (2006), Patelli 
and Prencipe (2007), and Barros et al. (2013), show that the presence of independent directors encourages firms to 
disclose further information to outsiders, which improves transparency and reduces information asymmetry. More 
recently, Botti et al. (2014) document inefficiency in the composition, structure, and functioning of French boards of 
directors. Using a sample of CAC40 firms, these authors empirically demonstrate that inefficient monitoring and 
oversight of top executives by boards leads to lower levels of internet financial reporting quality, which is likely to 
affect the information environment of these firms. 
 
In addition to examining the board of directors, agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) presents 
managerial ownership as a governance mechanism that solves possible agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders and that reduces potential agency costs. Managerial ownership is likely to reduce managers’ 
discretionary behavior and to improve firm transparency, implying an improved firm information environment. 
There is limited empirical evidence on how managerial ownership affects the information environment. For 
instance, Attig et al. (2006) present evidence that firms with greater deviation between ownership and control 
exhibit higher information asymmetry. Unlike the entrenchment hypothesis, the incentive alignment hypothesis 
argues that managerial ownership can induce managers to adopt a self-serving attitude, to the detriment of other 
shareholders. Cheng and Warfield (2005), among others, empirically support the entrenchment hypothesis and 
demonstrate that equity incentives promote earnings management. These authors document that managers with high 
equity incentives are more likely to sell shares in the future, and this motivates earnings management to increase the 
value of the shares to be sold. Baik et al. (2010), however, demonstrate a negative relation between managerial 
ownership on the one hand, and analyst coverage and the likelihood of issuing earnings forecasts, on the other hand. 
These empirical findings are consistent with the hypothesis that managerial ownership leads to a more opaque 
information environment. According to signaling theory (Spence, 1973), good corporate disclosure policy is a means 
to mitigate adverse selection problems and improve the firm information environment. Grossman (1981) uses 
signaling theory to explain how firm financial disclosures are useful to reducing information asymmetry. 
 
Theoretical studies predict that high-quality disclosures mitigate information asymmetry, attract more 
uninformed investors, and reduce the incentive of informed investors to search for private information (e.g., 
Diamond, 1985; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). Empirical research consistently shows that the quality of corporate 
disclosure, measured by the quality of earnings, negatively affects uncertainty and information asymmetry (Ascioglu 
et al., 2012). Similarly, Heflin et al. (2005) and Brown and Hillegeist (2007) use voluntary disclosure scores and 
show that the extent of corporate voluntary disclosure reduces information asymmetry. Brown and Hillegeist (2007) 
find that the quality of annual reports reduces information asymmetry, proxied by the probability of informed 
trading. 
 
In the spirit of existing studies, we focus on annual reports as the main vehicle for communication of both 
mandatory and voluntary information between the firm and its stakeholders (e.g., Neu et al., 1998). Annual reports 
represent a key summary of firm performance indicators (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 1996), and the level of 
information included is the best evidence of the level of firm disclosure (Zarb, 2007). Many studies examining 
disclosure policies in annual reports (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 1993) demonstrate a positive relation between 
disclosure level and other forms of disclosure. 
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The present study extends the literature and sheds additional light on the role of corporate governance 
practices (board characteristics, managerial ownership, and voluntary disclosure) on firm information environment. 
The empirical analysis uses the B-convex method on a sample of 70 French listed firms belonging to the SBF120 
index in 2007. The empirical findings show that 68.57% of our sample firms are efficient. Corporate governance 
mechanisms seem to effectively monitor the top executives of these firms, which improves their information-related 
decisions and reduces information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. A large proportion of our sample 
firms (31.42%) lies below the efficiency frontier, with efficiency scores different from 1. The corporate governance 
practices in these firms seem to be inefficient in improving the information environment. 
 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our methodological approach. Section 3 outlines the 
sample, describes the data, and defines the inputs and outputs used in the B-convex method. Section 4 reports and 
discusses the main empirical findings. Finally, Section 5 sets forth our conclusions. 
 
2. METHODOLOGY: B-CONVEX METHOD 
 
Using a non-parametric approach, the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method estimates the production 
frontiers distinguishing the efficient production units of those that are less.  It is a tool with a growing interest in the 
field of operations research. Inasmuch as most of the social organization can be assimilated as a Decision Making 
Units transforming a set input to a set of output, therefore the scope of the DEA method is highly large. The B-
convex analysis is an innovate method in DEA introduced by Briec and Liang (2011). The advantage of this method 
is that it relaxes the assumption of convexity in the consideration of the production set. Now we will briefly present 
the definitions and results used in this paper, for more technical details readers can refer to Briec and Liang (2011).  
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is called a B-Convex estimation of the production technology. It assumes that a company can produce a greater 
quantity of outputs when she can use a greater quantity of inputs. When the maximum of two input bundles are 
feasible, then the maximum they produce is also feasible. The figure 1 illustrates the frontier of B-Convex 
production technology. 
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Figure 1. B-Convex Production Technology 
 
B-Convexity includes, as a special case, a situation where inputs are assumed to be freely disposable. The 
B-Convexity approach implies, under this assumption, that the production set has an output cubic structure. In other 
words, an assumption of output complementarity is implicitly made on the technology. We employ the Farrell 
measure over the B-convex non-parametric technologies developed by Briec and Liang (2011).
1
 
 
3. DATA AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION 
 
3.1.  Sample Selection And Data Sources 
 
Our starting point is all French listed firms belonging to the SBF120 in 2007. We exclude financial firms 
(SIC codes between 6000 and 6999), because they are subject to specific disclosure requirements, and firms with 
missing data. Our final sample consists of 70 firms. We focus on the SFB120 firms because they are more likely to 
disclose detailed information in their annual reports and to adopt good governance practices. During the 2000s, 
French firms that won annual report awards were among the SBF120 firms. Corporate governance data are hand-
collected from firm annual reports available on the AMF website.
2
 Financial data are retrieved from the Worldscope 
Database. Stock price returns are from the Datastream database.  
 
3.2.  Outputs 
 
This research uses a B-convex approach to examine the association between corporate governance, 
voluntary disclosure, and firm information environment for a sample of SBF120 firms. We consider three outputs 
that proxy for the quality of the firm information environment. First, we examine annual average effective bid–ask 
spreads (Spread), which is calculated as the yearly average of daily effective bid–ask spreads. Consistent with Lin et 
al. (1995) and Heflin et al. (2005), we measure the daily effective spread as twice the absolute value of the 
difference between a transaction price and the midpoint of the bid and ask prices. It is computed using the following 
formula: 
                                                 
1 Mathemtica is used to program the algorithm that calculates the efficiency scores. 
2 AMF (Autorité des Marchés Financiers) is the French equivalent of the U.S Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
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where Askt (Bidt) is the best ask (bid) price on day t. 
 
To assess annual average spread, we divide the sum of daily effective spreads by the total number of 
trading days during the quotation year. 
 
Second, we examine analyst forecasts error (AnaError), which is measured as the absolute value of actual 
earnings per share minus average forecasted earnings per share, divided by the share price at the beginning of the 
year. Finally, we use the average standard deviation of stock return (StdReturn) as a proxy of the firm information 
environment. 
 
3.3.  Inputs 
 
The first input is the score of voluntary disclosure in annual reports (Score), measured using a self-
constructed “disclosure index.” We construct this disclosure index based on the related research of Meek et 
al. (1995), Botosan (1997), Chau and Gray (2002), Eng and Mak (2003), Lim et al. (2007) and Francis et al. (2008). 
The index contains 112 items belonging to four groups: strategic (30 items), financial (36 items), non-financial (35 
items), and governance information (11 items). Table 1 presents the checklist of items included in the disclosure 
scores.
3
 
 
We use three additional corporate governance inputs: Managerial ownership (ManagerOwn) is the 
proportion of shares held by top management. Board independence (BoardIndp) is the ratio of independent to total 
directors on the board. Board size (BoardSize) is the total number of directors on the board. 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1. The Checklist Of Voluntary Disclosure 
This table presents the checklist of items used to develop the disclosure index.   
It also shows which items overlap those in existing studies. 
Checklist Of Items References 
A - Strategic information  
A1. General information about the firm  
1. Brief  history of company A, B, C , E 
2. General description of  the business B, D 
3. Main products B, D 
4. Main Markets B, D 
A2. Corporate Strategy  
5. Statement of the main objectives A, B, C, D, E 
6. Statement of the financial objectives A, C, E 
7. Current Strategy A, B, C, F 
8. Impact of strategy on current results B 
9. Future strategy A, B, C 
10. Impact of strategy on future results A, C, E 
A3. R & D activities  
11. Description of R & D projects A, C 
12. Corporate policy on R & D A, C 
13. Location of R & D activities A, C, D 
14. Number employed in R & D A, C, E 
  
                                                 
3 See Barros et al. (2013) for more details on the construction of the voluntary disclosure index. 
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Checklist Of Items References 
A4. Analysis and discussion of management Review of projects  
15. Review of operations B 
16. Competitive environment B, D 
17. The most significant events B, D 
18. Change in sales and profits B, D 
19. Change in cost of goods sold B, D 
20. Change in expenses B, D 
21. Change in inventory B, D 
22. Change in the share price B, D 
A5. Future prospects  
23. Future development channels A, B, C 
24. Qualitative forecast of sales A, B, C, E 
25. Quantitative forecast of sales A, B, C, D, F 
26. Qualitative forecast of profits A, B, C, D, E, F 
27. Quantitative forecast of profits A, B, C, E 
28. Assumptions underlying the forecast A, B, C 
29. Review of forecasts A, B, C 
30. Description of capital project committed A, B, C 
B - No-financial information  
B1. Employees information  
1. Geographical distribution of employees A, C 
2. Number of employees by sex A, C 
3. Number of employees by age A, C 
4. Categories of employees by function A, C 
5. Number of employees for 2 or more years A, C, E 
6. Average compensation per employee A, B 
7. Added value per employee A, B 
8. Data productivity A, B, C 
9. Safety policy A, B, C 
10. Cost of safety measures A, C 
11. Data on accidents A, C, E 
12. Policy on communication A, C 
13. Redundancy information A, C 
14. Reason for changes in employees’ number or categories over time A, C 
15. Recruitment problems and related policy A, C 
B2. Information about the training policy  
16. Amount spent in training program A, C, E 
17. Nature of training A, C, E 
18. Policy on training A, C, E 
19. Categories of employees trained A, C, E 
B3. Social policy and value-added information  
20. Safety of products A, C 
21. Program of environmental protection A, C, E 
22. Charitable Donations A, C, E 
23. Community programs A, C, E 
24. Value added data A, C, E 
25. Value added ratios A, C, E 
26. Qualitative value-added information A, C, E 
B4.  Segmental Information  
27. Geographical distribution of invested capital A, C, E 
28. Geographical distribution of net assets A, C 
29. Geographical distribution of production A, C, E 
30. Expenditure in the business lines A, C 
31. Revenue by business line A, C 
32. Competitor analysis- quantitative A, C 
33. Competitor analysis- qualitative A, C 
34. Market share analysis-quantitative A, C 
35. Market share analysis-qualitative A, C 
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Checklist Of Items References 
C-Financial Information  
C1. Performance indicators (without from the financial statements)  
1. Performance indicators A, B, C 
2. Financial data for the last five years A, B, C, D, E 
3. Turnover A, B, C, D, F 
4. Net income A, B, C, D, F 
5. Shareholders’ equity A, B, C, D, 
6. Total assets A, B, C, D, F 
7. Earnings per share A, B, C, 
8. Dividend payout policy A, B, C, 
9. Transfer pricing policy A, B, C, 
10. Impact of any accounting policy changes on results A, B, C, 
11. Advertising expenditure A, B, C, E 
12. Effect of inflation on results A, B, C 
13. Effect of inflation on assets A, B, C 
14. Effect of fluctuating interest rates on the result A, B, C, E 
C2.  Financial ratios  
15. Liquidity Ratio A, B, C, E 
16. Turnover ratio of assets A, B, C 
17. Debt ratio A, B, C, E 
18. Profitability ratios A, B, C, E, F 
19. Other useful ratios A, B, C, E 
C3. Forecasted information  
20. Cash flow forecast A, B, C, D 
21. Estimates of capital increase A, B, C 
22. Earnings estimates A, B, C 
23. Effect of inflation currency fluctuations on future operation A, C 
24. Effect of currency fluctuation of interest rates on future operations A, C 
C4. Information on exchange rates  
25. Impact of currency fluctuations on current results A, B, C 
26. Impact of currency fluctuations on future operations A, C, E 
27. Estimates of currency fluctuations A, B, C 
28. Exchange rates used in accounting A, B, C 
29. Long-term debt by currency A, C 
30. Short-term debt by currency A, C 
C5. Other financial information  
31. Share price at year end A, C 
32. Share prices trend A, C, E 
33. Market capitalization at year end A, C, E 
34. Trend of market capitalization A, C 
35. Size of shareholdings A, C 
36. Forecasted market share A, C, D, F 
D- Governance information  
1. Ownership structure A, C 
2. Organizational Chart A, B, C, E 
D1. Composition of the board of director  
3. Personal Profile A, C 
4. Description of the position occupied A, C 
5. Duration of belonging to the company A, B, C 
6. Number of shareholders belonging to the board of directors A, B, C 
7. Academic profile of the directors A, B, C 
8. Presence of Internal Audit Committee A, B, C 
9. Age of the executives A, B, C 
10. Profile of the executives A, B, C 
11. Individual remuneration A, B, C 
A: Meek, Robert, and Gray (1995); B: Eng and Mak (2003); C: Chau and Gray (2002); D: Botosan (1997); E: Lim, Matolcsy, and Chow (2007); 
F: Francis, Nanda, and Olsson (2008) 
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Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis. Panel A shows the statistics of 
the output variables. StdReturn ranges from 13.24 to 54.18 with a mean (median) value of 26.11 (24.56), which 
indicates high volatility of the stock returns of SBF120 firms. Spread ranges from 0.0102 to 0.5907, with an average 
(median) of 0.0728 (0.0422). This differs from what is observed in the Anglo-Saxon stock markets. Heflin et al. 
(2005), for instance, finds an effective spread ranging from 0.090 to 0.436, with an average value of 0.162, on the 
US stock market. The effective spread has a standard deviation of 0.0944, which indicates a larger dispersion than 
the effective spread in the US stock market, where the standard deviation of the effective spread is 0.038 (Heflin et 
al. 2005). Analyst forecast error (AnaError) ranges from 0 to 1.3433 with a mean (median) value of 0.3951 
(0.3676). Analyst forecast error has a standard deviation of 0.3760, which is greater than in the US (0.0694) as 
documented by Zhang (2006). The forecasts of financial analysts are less accurate during the crisis year of 2007 than 
in prior years. For instance, Boubaker and Labégorre (2006) show that analyst forecasts errors for French listed 
firms range from 0 to 1.556, with a mean (median) value of 0.094 (0.014) in the 1999–2000 period. Overall, the 
descriptive statistics of these three outputs indicate evidence of a substantial variation in information asymmetry 
among SBF120 firms. 
 
Panel B presents the descriptive statistics of the input variables. Voluntary disclosure in annual reports 
dramatically varies among sample firms. Score has a mean (median) of 48.28 (48.50) and ranges from 26 to 73 with 
a standard deviation of 11.50. One-quarter of sample firms disclose less than 38 among 112 items, despite 
publication of several codes of best corporate governance practices in the past two decades that encourage 
information disclosure. This conforms with the conclusions drawn by Fitch Ratings that French firms would benefit 
from better financial disclosure and accountability policies. Board size also exhibits wide dispersion across the 
sampled firms. On average, French boards are composed of 11 directors. Board size ranges from 4 to 21 directors. 
Board independence varies dramatically across sample firms. Independent directors represent, on average, half the 
directors of French boards. However, some boards are fully independent, whereas others are composed exclusively 
of insiders. Managerial ownership shows systematic differences across sample firms. It ranges from a minimum of 
0% to a maximum of 99%, with a mean (median) value of 13.39% (3). These results are consistent with the findings 
of Barros et al. (2013) and Botti et al. (2014), who show that French listed firms do not exhibit similar corporate 
governance practices. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
This table summarizes the descriptive statistics of variables used in the analysis. 
 Minimum First Quartile Mean Median Third Quartile Maximum Standard Deviation 
Panel A: Outputs 
StdReturn 13.24 19.485 26.1194 24.56 30.07 54.18 8.5835 
Spread 0.0102 0.0284 0.0728 0.0422 0.0790 0.5907 0.0944 
AnaError 0 0.0319 0.3951 0.3676 0.6322 1.3433 0.3760 
Panel B: Inputs 
Score 26 38.5 48.2857 48.5 55.5 73 11.5019 
BoardSize 0 33.3333 49.3085 45.8041 63.3522 100 21.9374 
BoardIndp 4 9 11.5571 11.5 14 21 3.8321 
Ownership 0 0.1829 13.3993 3 15.5 99 21.6722 
 
4.2. B-Convex Application Results 
 
The present paper sheds some light on the role of corporate governance and voluntary disclosure on the 
firm information environment. Our model is output-oriented because we consider that the quality of the firm 
information environment depends mainly on corporate governance mechanisms (i.e., board of directors and 
ownership structure) and voluntary disclosure decisions. Table 3 provides efficiency scores for sample firms. Firms 
are defined as Decision Managerial Unities (DMUs). The efficiency scores are the solution of the optimization 
program presented in Section 2. 
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Table 3.  
This table presents the efficiency scores of our sampled firms (DMUs) 
Panel A: B-Convex Application Results 
DMU 
Efficiency 
Scores 
DMU 
Efficiency 
Scores 
DMU 
Efficiency 
Scores 
DMU 
Efficiency 
Scores 
1 1.3449 24 1 36 1 59 1 
2 1 25 1 37 1 60 1.2685 
3 1.9966 26 1 38 1 61 1.0792 
4 1 27 1 39 1 62 1 
5 1 28 1 40 1.3883 63 1 
6 1 29 1 41 1.2581 64 1 
7 2.4927 30 1 42 1.6406 65 1 
8 1 31 1 43 1 66 1 
9 1.1915 32 1 44 1 67 1 
10 1 33 1 45 1.0669 68 1 
11 1 34 1 46 1 69 1.4821 
12 1 35 1 47 1.4964 70 1 
13 1.8105 25 1 48 1 62 1 
14 1.1122 26 1 49 1 63 1 
15 1 27 1 50 1 64 1 
16 1.0169 28 1 51 1.5535 65 1 
17 1.0729 29 1 52 1 66 1 
18 1 30 1 53 1 67 1 
19 1.2310 31 1 54 1 68 1 
20 1.4547 32 1 55 1 69 1.4821 
21 1 33 1 56 1.2698 70 1 
22 1 34 1 57 1   
23 1.3870 35 1 58 1.0139   
Total number of efficient firms 48 
Percentage of efficient firms 68.5714 
  
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of efficiency scores 
This table summarizes the characteristics (descriptive statistics) of efficiency scores obtained from B-convex model 
Descriptive statistics of efficiency scores 
Minimum 1 
First quartile 1 
Mean 1.1232 
Median 1 
Third quartile 1.0777 
Maximum 2.4927 
Standard deviation 0.2683 
 
Efficiency scores equal 1 for 48 DMUs, corresponding to 68.57% of sample firms, which means that these 
DMUs are located on the efficiency frontier. Ownership structure, board monitoring, and voluntary disclosure in 
these firms seem to be effective in improving the firm information environment. Under good corporate governance 
practices, among other factors, better board characteristics and voluntary disclosure appear to reduce uncertainty, 
improve the quality of analyst forecasts, and mitigate the adverse selection problem. 
 
The results also show that 31.42% (22 DMUs, including DMUs 1, 2, 9, 13, and 23) have efficiency scores 
equal to or greater than 1. This result suggests that these 22 DMUs can improve their information environment using 
the same characteristics of their boards of directors and the same level of voluntary disclosure. For instance, with the 
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same governance practices, DMUs 1, 9, and 23 can reduce their information asymmetry levels, respectively, by 
34.49%, 19.15%, and 38.70%, thereby improving, subsequently, their information environment. Governing 
characteristics, including among other factors, board composition, board size, ownership structure, and voluntary 
disclosures do not appear effectively to reduce information asymmetry and improve the firm information 
environment. Moreover, the percentage of inefficient firms is considered large for SBF 120 firms that exhibit the 
highest market capitalizations, suggesting the presence of inefficiency problems due to ownership structure, board 
composition, and firm disclosure policy. 
 
Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Ben Ali, 2013), we show that in France, a market characterized by poor 
investor protection, firms that exhibit poor internal corporate governance mechanisms present low disclosure, 
leading to higher information asymmetry and poor firm information environment. A significant proportion of 
SBF120 firms need to improve their governance practices and disclosure policy to be more effective in improving 
their information environment. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This study sheds further light on the role of corporate governance and voluntary disclosure in shaping the 
firm information environment. Our empirical analysis uses non-parametric B-convexity methodology on a sample of 
70 French listed firms belonging to the SBF120 index. The findings of the B-convexity approach show that 68.57% 
of sample firms are efficient (48 firms). Corporate governance mechanisms, such as boards of directors and 
disclosure policy, appear to effectively monitor the top executives of these firms, which reduces information 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Such firms disclose more voluntary information needed by various 
stakeholders to assess firm performance and to make sound decisions, which in turn improves their information 
environment. The remaining 22 firms have efficiency scores different than 1, suggesting that they lie below the 
efficiency frontier. Ownership structure, board characteristics, and voluntary disclosure of these firms appears to 
lead to higher information asymmetry, lower analyst forecast accuracy, and higher stock return volatility, resulting 
in a more opaque information environment. These findings suggest that there is room to improve the quality of the 
information environment of SBF120 firms. 
 
The findings of this study hold interesting theoretical and practical implications. First, this study sets forth 
an original way to gauge the role and effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms and disclosure decisions in 
improving the firm information environment. Second, it uses a new approach based on B-convexity methodology to 
compute the efficiency scores. Third, it helps French policy makers and regulators, since it points out the 
weaknesses in corporate governance practices that lead to a low-quality information environment. 
 
The results of this study should be interpreted cautiously, given the presence of several limitations common 
to all similar studies. First, B-convexity results depend on the choice of input variables, as in other data envelopment 
techniques. We draw from the literature to select a battery of relevant inputs that alone influence the outputs to 
reduce the effects of this limitation (Thanassoulis, 2001). The chosen inputs are the most relevant determinants of 
the firm information environment, which limits the sensitivity of the results to the inputs. Second, as in prior studies, 
one may question the homogeneity of the firms that comprise our sample, in spite of multiple characteristics 
common to all sample firms (i.e., belonging to the SBF120 index, greater liquidity, large size, important foreign 
ownership, followed by many financial analysts, etc.). Firms that do not belong to the same industry may face 
different market conditions, which may make their comparability more difficult. However, one can always claim 
that firms are not homogeneous and not comparable to be together in the same sample for a B-convexity analysis. In 
addition, applying a B-convexity approach for a small sample of 70 non-financial firms increases the probability that 
a given firm will be found relatively efficient, thus limiting the general character of the results. Third, the research 
design does not permit disentangling, which among board characteristics, disclosure policy, and ownership structure 
operates more effectively compared to the others. 
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